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From ‘club of the rich’ to ‘globalization à la carte’: 
On the successes and limits of reform at the OECD 
 
Judith Clifton and Daniel Díaz-Fuentes 
 
Abstract 
 
Recognising the declining weight of its members in the world economy, the OECD, 
formerly known as a ‘club of rich, industrialised nations’, is undergoing unprecedented 
organizational reform, including a more inclusive membership logic, engagement with 
new global players, and outreach to developing countries, all with a view to 
guaranteeing its continued relevance as a central actor in the task of global policy 
provision. Using the concepts of global public goods, clubs and models of 
multilateralism, this article critically evaluates the successes and limits of the OECD’s 
reform, arguing it is adopting a cautious approach to expansion – globalization ‘ à la 
carte’. Meaningful reform towards greater inclusion is apparent in the way research on 
non-members has been mainstreamed, and in its increased work with both emerging 
powers and developing countries. Limits to reform are found in institutional rigidities 
including its over-representation of Europe and under-representation of Asia and other 
continents, reflected through staff profiles and membership. These biases may in turn 
reduce its attractiveness as a global forum to new players, particularly, China.  
 
Policy Implications 
• Shifts in the world economy towards the east and the south pose significant 
challenges to international organizations, which must ensure processes of global 
governance fully involve key actors, in the quest for functional and legitimate 
global policy. 
 
• The OECD is casting off its ‘club’ inheritance through unprecedented 
organizational change, including a more inclusive approach towards 
membership, and the adoption of a new agenda as regards the services and 
policies it provides. 
 
• Future reform will be constrained until the OECD goes beyond its current 
approach of ‘globalization à la carte’ and convinces emerging powers - 
particularly the BRICS - as to the benefits of working with them.  
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‘…the OECD is changing. It is becoming more inclusive, more sensitive to diversity and 
the many paths that have led to growth and development…the Organization’s new 
global strategy is increasing its relevance and responsiveness to the needs of the 
international community.’ (OECD, 2009a) 
 
‘Nor will anyone in the West have the courage to state another obvious truth: after 
having failed in its core mission, the OECD has clearly become a ‘sunset’ organisation. 
Its disappearance will have no impact on the developing world.’(Mahbubani, 2008: 69). 
 
 
The OECD has adopted a bold new mantra in recent years: to guarantee its global nature 
and relevance in the architecture of international organizations (OECD, 2006). 
Organizational changes toward this aim have accelerated. Enlargement to Chile, Israel 
and Slovenia in 2010, bringing membership to thirty-three countries, with planned 
imminent or short-term enlargement to Estonia and Russia, is rendering the 
organization’s traditional bent towards Western countries more diverse in political and 
economic terms. Deeper cooperation with important emerging economies - Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia and South Africa – has been formalised through its ‘enhanced 
engagement’ programme, with a view to their possible future membership (OECD, 
2005a). No longer is OECD research and analysis of non-members conducted ‘at the 
margins’ by its development-related bodies, since this work has been mainstreamed 
throughout the organization. Regional programmes have been set up throughout the 
developing world in Africa, Asia and Latin America (OECD, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
The OECD is also seeking to play an increasingly influential role in the preparation for 
and holding of G20 summits, as well as to collaborate more extensively with an array of 
international, national and local organizations. But these ambitions raise important 
questions. From its establishment in 1961, the OECD constituted a North Atlantic 
organization, known colloquially as the ‘rich man’s club’ or the ‘economic NATO’. 
When founded, it replaced - while absorbing much of - the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), essentially a realpolitik project promoted by the United 
States to oversee the management of Marshall Aid and coordinate economic policy in 
Western Europe during the post-war period, in preference to permitting a Bretton 
Woods organization to do so (ul Haq et al, 1995: Reinalda, 2009). Evolving over five 
decades, the OECD became known as an exclusive club with membership restricted to 
industrialised countries, mostly based on the transatlantic alliance. Given the OECD’s 
particular evolution and idiosyncrasies, can it emerge as a truly global actor, how, and 
what are the limits of this transformation? The central aim of this paper is to answer 
these questions.  
 
To help frame the discussion, we utilise concepts of public and club goods and the 
related concepts, global and club models of multilateralism. Public goods are 
traditionally conceptualised as being non-rival in consumption and having non-
excludable benefits, whilst club goods are thought of as being partially non-rival in 
consumption whilst the benefits of their consumption can be rendered excludable. 
Global models of multilateralism refer to inclusive forms of governance, where 
concerns focus on ensuring membership is representative, democratic and fair, and 
where participation means that members can actually contribute to and influence policy 
outcomes (Kaul et al, 2003). Club models of multilateral cooperation, in contrast, are 
understood as those where a small number of rich countries forge the rules in often non-
transparent ways, excluding poorer countries as well as other actors, such as labour, 
NGOs and civil society (Keohane and Nye, 2001). After setting out these concepts, we 
argue that the OECD historically constituted a club model of multilateralism par 
excellence, and opted to provide particular goods to a restricted membership from its 
origins to the end of the Cold War. Our argument is based on close examination of the 
evolving logic of OECD membership, its decision-making norms, its domination of 
staff by European nationals, and the organization’s priorities as regards the goods it 
provided, how, and in whose interests. We then critically analyse the organization’s 
efforts to transform itself from a club to a more global organization, which started 
gradually from 1989 but accelerated during the 2000s, particularly as regards its 
strategy towards greater inclusiveness through rapprochement with non-members. 
Reform has entailed significant change to its governance, organizational design and 
budget. We sourced information through eighteen interviews during 2009 and 2010 
with high-ranking current and former OECD officials, including former Secretary 
Generals and their Chief Economic Advisors, current and former OECD Directors of 
Global Strategy, Economics, Trade and Agriculture, Development Cooperation, Public 
Governance and Territorial Development, Public Affairs and Human Resources, as well 
as through formal documents in the Paris archive, official data on the human resources 
profile of the OECD Secretariat from 1961-2009, personal staff memoirs, private notes, 
correspondence and secondary material.
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We find that organizational survival is the prime driver of OECD reform. The OECD 
has recognised above all the importance of functional challenges to its future efficiency 
and legitimacy (Randall, 2001). OECD members and staff are cognisant that, firstly, 
member countries are increasingly vulnerable to emerging economies and, secondly, 
that members’ combined share of economic growth is shrinking as emerging economies 
make their mark (OECD, 2010a. Its highest body, the Council, has publicly recognised 
that if the organization does not become more inclusive, it risks being ineffectual and, 
even, irrelevant (OECD, 2006). Confronting the challenges head on, heroic steps have 
been taken by officials and members to transform the organization, particularly as 
regards re-engineering its club mentality towards more inclusion through transforming 
its external relations with non-members. One indicator of change is that official 
documents have acknowledged there are more paths to development than the ‘OECD 
way’ (OECD, 2003). But two internal obstacles may slow down deeper change: firstly, 
vested interests of OECD members, particularly European ones, who may not always 
perceive sharing power with newcomers as being in their interest; secondly, the 
continued dominance of Europeans in OECD posts, which may limit the organization’s 
effectiveness in attracting new members. But both these issues are linked to a 
formidable and ongoing external challenge: to persuade key non-members of the 
desirability of deeper integration into the organization.  
 
Club versus Global Goods and Models of Multilateralism 
 
Much of the discussion on club and global models of multilateralism in the international 
organization and political economy literature is based on seminal contributions from 
economics, particularly those by Nobel Prize winners Paul Samuelson and James 
Buchanan, on public goods and club theory, respectively (Samuelson, 1954; Buchanan, 
1965). A ‘pure’ public good is a good (or, usually, a service) which is non-rival in 
consumption and which has non-excludable benefits. Commonly cited examples are law 
and order, security and defence, economic and financial stability and communicable 
disease control. Once these goods have been provided, individuals can – and sometimes 
must – consume them. The goods’ benefits are indivisible in that they exist for all 
individuals in the same amount and with the same characteristics. Some scholars have 
argued that public goods become more apparent when they are undersupplied: for 
instance, people take financial stability and health for granted, but are alarmed by 
financial crises or flu epidemics. Beyond ‘pure’ public goods are goods whose 
characteristics fulfil only part of these two requirements. For instance, some goods are 
rivalrous in consumption but their benefits are not excludable, such as the atmosphere. 
Other goods are partially non-rival in their consumption (until there is ‘congestion’), but 
their benefits are potentially excludable. Some of these are classified as ‘club goods’ 
and text book illustrations include swimming pools, cable television and golf clubs, but 
a more relevant example for international organizations is knowledge. These classic 
definitions of public and club goods have been recently challenged and reconceptualised 
in a series of highly influential publications led by Inge Kaul under the auspices of the 
United Nations Programme for Development, as we discuss below. 
 
Following this logic, Keohane and Nye (2001) analysed international organization 
reform using ideal-type models of club and global multilateralism. They defined club 
multilateralism as a form of governance dominated by a small number of rich and 
usually like-minded countries. Here, negotiations typically took place between 
technically trained national experts in specific issue-areas, for instance, linking trade, 
intellectual property rights or environmental regimes, across the leading capitalist 
countries. Excluded from discussions are developing and communist countries, as well 
as experts from other potentially related fields (environmental and labour standard 
experts in trade talks, for instance). Because governance is closed-off and not 
transparent, decision-makers cannot be made fully accountable. Policies and other 
decisions emanating from such a process serve the interest of the selected few, 
reflecting national interests and cross-national compromises. Keohane and Nye argued 
that most international economic organizations, including the GATT and the IMF, were 
run as clubs until at least the late 1990s. However, the end of the Cold War marked a 
change, as club politics came under increasing attack due to functional and normative 
challenges (Randall, 2001). Functional challenges included the perception that 
developed economies were vulnerable to developing ones, so, club-like governance was 
seen as increasingly obsolete since it excluded key economies from partaking in 
financing and managing goods or services required. Related to this was the normative 
concern that broader and greater participation in organizations by developing countries 
and NGOs was required in order to ensure the legitimacy of organizations and 
compliance with the decisions they took. Not broadening the club towards a more 
global configuration of governance could mean policies are perceived as lacking 
legitimacy, even generating popular protest. Accepting the challenge that international 
economic organizations need to adopt more inclusive and broader forms of governance, 
scholars have put forward recommendations on how best this could be achieved. 
 
One of the most influential recent contributions to this debate, both in policy-making 
and academic circles, has been articulated by Inge Kaul and associates (Kaul et al., 
1999, 2003, 2006). Kaul’s point of departure is to revisit the classic formulation of 
public goods, critiquing this as inadequate, since society has become highly capable at 
modifying the (non) rivalrous and (non) excludability of a good’s benefits, for instance, 
using technology. Samuelson’s public goods theory is reconceptualised based on the 
insight that public goods are socially produced through political decisions. In addition, 
she critiques classic public goods theory as assuming provision is at the local or national 
level, as she argues that globalization has meant more public goods and bads can 
potentially spill over national borders. It follows that states need to adopt political 
decisions to prioritise provision and management of certain public goods in order to 
avoid their underprovision. Kaul et al. directly ‘match’ the design of international 
organizations with the efficiency by which they produce public goods. In particular, 
Kaul et al. argue that global models of multilateralism, which promote more inclusion, 
participation and democratic governance, are better equipped than club models in the 
task of providing and managing global public goods (Kaul et al., 2003). Club 
multilateralism can produce ‘mismatch’ when producing global public goods, since 
policy formation leaves out important actors involved in the producing of a particular 
good or the suffering of a particular bad, leading to poor quality policy and growing 
perceptions of illegitimacy, sparking discord. Coinciding with a number of international 
organization scholars, Kaul et al. encourage international organizations to shift away 
from club towards a more global multilateral approach (Helleiner, 2010; Woods, 2010). 
Now, it is over-simplistic to expect that global governance will simply replace club 
governance evenly across international economic organizations. Most will opt for mixes 
of governance arrangements, as Beeson and Bell argued in the case of G20 governance 
(Beeson and Bell, 2009). Nevertheless, there is a trend whereby club governance is 
increasingly perceived as inadequate, whilst major international economic 
organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, are embracing more inclusive, 
diverse approaches (Keohane and Nye, 2001). The OECD is amongst these reformers, 
as we argue in the third section. Before we examine the extent and limits of its reforms, 
we use the concepts of club and global goods and models of multilateralism to examine 
the evolution of the OECD’s club inheritance. 
 
The Club Inheritance of the OECD 
 
For the OECD to successfully transform itself from ‘club’ to more ‘global’ governance, 
it must overcome a distinct challenge not faced by peer organizations with more 
universal membership such as the IMF, the World Bank or even the GATT/WTO: for 
decades, most countries in the world were unwelcome to join the ‘club’, whilst its 
Western members assumed they were ‘developed’ or economically ‘superior’ to their 
Eastern and Southern non-member counterparts. Today, the OECD is seeking to ‘woo’ 
some of those very countries it previously deemed unsuitable for membership. In order 
to explore the club inheritance of the OECD we examine four significant aspects of its 
inheritance: the logic of its membership; norms governing decision-making; the 
evolution of its staff by number, profile and nationality; and the kinds of public goods 
or services it provided and in whose interests. On all counts, we argue that, until the 
beginning of change from 1989, the OECD constituted a club model of multilateralism 
par excellence. 
  
What logic guided OECD membership? Analysis of the evolution of its membership 
points to a predominant logic bound up with Cold War politics and capitalism which 
remained largely unchanged until the 1990s. The OECD was created in 1961, replacing, 
whilst also inheriting important features - including membership - from the OEEC. The 
OEEC, in turn, was essentially a realpolitik project, established in 1948, in parallel with 
the Berlin Blockade (1948-9) and the ensuing Korean War (1950-3), on the initiative of 
the United States, in order to control Marshall Aid distribution and the reconstruction of 
Western Europe more directly than it would be able to via the International Bank of 
Development and Reconstruction (ul Haq et al, 1995). Its contemporaries labelled the 
OEEC the ‘economic counterpart’ of NATO and the political ‘rival’ of the Molotov 
Plan, later to become COMECON (Gordon, 1956). Its membership was restricted to 
certain Western European members; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and both occupied zones of Western 
Germany. Though much later, during the 1990s, OECD publications would make 
reference to one of the core values of its members as being ‘democratic’, this was not 
always so, as lacking democratic government did not prove a barrier to joining or 
remaining a member, as borne out by the instances of members under authoritarian rule 
- Greece, Spain, Portugal and Turkey. Together, OEEC members developed a strong 
‘club-like’ mentality, which often involved assuming confrontational postures towards 
the Soviet bloc.
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 Physically, its headquarters were located in a privileged Parisian 
suburb, in the Chateau de la Muette, previously home to French royalty and rebuilt for 
Henri de Rothschild, before being occupied during the Second World War by the 
German Naval Command until it was taken over by the United States Army. Marshall 
Aid was terminated in 1952 and the European economy recovered quicker than had 
been expected. Rather than disbanding the OEEC, in 1961 - the same year as the Berlin 
Wall was being built - the OECD was established to replace it. Contemporary scholars 
understood the purpose of the OECD was to help consolidate the transatlantic military 
and economic alliance between North America and Europe in a context of the Cold War 
and of increased interdependence (Diebold, 1963). The OECD inherited all the OEEC 
members, in addition to the US, Canada and Spain, taking its membership to twenty. It 
also inherited its infrastructure in Paris and its nearly 620 (overwhelmingly European) 
staff. Expansion beyond the original set of members was restricted to Japan (1964), 
Finland (1969), and ‘Western offshoots’ (Maddison, 2006) Australia (1971) and New 
Zealand (1973). Though membership had expanded to the pacific, the organization 
remained a predominantly transatlantic one, and members assumed that the main 
attraction of the OECD for new members was economic activity within the transatlantic 
axis.
3
 Membership expansion froze from 1973 onwards, coinciding with the crisis of 
United States’ hegemony epitomised by the collapse of the Gold Standard and the first 
petroleum crisis. It would not be until after the end of the Cold War that the question of 
OECD enlargement would find its way back to the negotiating table, as we discuss in 
the third section. 
 
Decision-making norms at the OECD differ, as in other organizations, depending on the 
layer of governance in question. The OECD governing structure is pyramidal, 
comprising the Council at its apex, the Committees and the Secretariat. Governance in 
the Council is achieved through one representative for each member plus the European 
Commission, each of whom have one vote. Countries which do not agree with a 
decision may abstain and are not subject to comply. Member representatives are most 
often ambassadors who work on a full-time, permanent basis in Paris. The preferred 
method of decision-making at the Council is consensus-seeking. Theoretically, then, 
each member has an equal say, though members of the European Union enjoy a strong 
presence both through the sum of their members as well as through the Commission 
representative. The Committee structure, which has grown organically, is often seen as 
the OECD’s most unique organizational feature: here, national policy-makers from the 
capitals interact with each other and also with professional staff working on the same 
issue-areas from the Secretariat to debate, produce and diffuse policy. By 2010, there 
were around 200 committees, sub-committees and working groups on a great diversity 
of topics. Each of these bodies is allowed to establish their own rules for membership: 
whilst many are open to all OECD members, a few are restricted to ‘inner circles’ of 
select members.
4
 One of the most influential of these bodies, Working Party 3 on 
Policies of the Promotion of Better International Payments System, of the Economic 
Policy Committee, is run by G7 members plus the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the European Commission. Should other countries wish to participate, they can only 
do so when invited under observer status. This norm has caused tensions when the 
OECD has sought to broader participation by inviting China as observer, which 
complained about the participation rights of Europe, particularly, small economies, such 
as the Netherlands.
5
 Business and workers’ interests have been organised in the OECD 
through the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the Trade Union Advisory 
Committee since 1962. It was not until the 2000s that the OECD institutionalised 
relations with civil society through organizing open ‘forums’ and increasing invitations 
to participate in committees, partially in reaction to unexpected popular outcry from the 
middle of the 1990s against its proposals on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(Kobrin, 1998). 
 
Governance of organizations is also shaped by those individuals working inside it. 
Though data on staff numbers, profile and nationality are imperfect indicators, this is 
one route to offering some insight into an organization’s inheritance. The OECD has 
always recruited on merit and does not use national quota systems. Yet for decades, its 
staff was dominated by nationals from three post-war allies, France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, in that order. When the OECD replaced the OEEC, it 
inherited nearly 620 staff, over 70 percent of whom were French nationals, followed by 
the British, comprising nearly 13 percent.
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 Staff profiles are tiered into four categories: 
‘A’ grade are professional staff, including economists, policy-analysts, head of 
departments, deputies or directors; ‘B’ are secretarial, technical or support staff; ‘C’ are 
manual staff and ‘L’ are translators. In 1961, the OECD inherited a staff dominated by 
administrators: over half the posts were ‘B’ posts, while ‘A’ and ‘C’ categories 
accounted for around 20 percent respectively. French nationals were particularly 
dominant in secretarial, manual and linguistic posts, but also occupied nearly 38 percent 
of professional posts, as seen in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
The ‘golden age’ for recruitment was between 1961 and 1973, as shown in Table 2. In 
this period, staff numbers doubled, to 1,580, whilst the OECD became increasingly 
professionalized as ‘A’ grade staff increased to one third of the total. During this time, 
the presence of Americans in professional posts increased whilst the hold of French and 
British nationals slowly fell. By 1973, the three countries combined held 57 percent of 
‘A’ jobs. Just as 1973 marked the end of OECD membership expansion, it also marked 
the end of the golden age for recruitment. Worse was to follow: the arrival of Ronald 
Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom coincided 
with a period of recruitment stagnation across all categories. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
So, in 1989, on the eve of the end of the Cold War, the three post-war allies, France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, accounted for 70 percent of OECD jobs. To put 
this into some perspective, Japanese nationals had barely made incursions into the 
OECD, totalling only 37 staff, despite the fact that membership dated from 1964 and the 
country being a major contributor to the budget. While we recognise that staff 
nationality is a crude indicator, it arguably became more important from the 1980s, 
when the tradition of awarding indefinite contracts as ‘international civil servants’ was 
drastically reduced, replaced by fixed-term contracts, with the consequences that hired 
staff would seek to maintain interests ‘back home’ rather than prioritise the defence of 
international, collective interests.
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 Dominance by France and the United States is also 
visible in recruitment at the top levels of the organization. Between 1961 and 1984, the 
OECD Secretariat was headed by a Secretary General from a smaller European country, 
Denmark and the Netherlands, supported by two deputy directors, one from the United 
States and the other from France. It was only in 1984, when the French diplomat Jean-
Claude Paye was selected as Secretary General, that France relinquished its traditional 
post as deputy. Changes to this configuration at the top did not start to change until 
1990, as we discuss below.  
 
What public goods or services has the OECD provided, how, and in whose interests? 
The organization has little recourse to mandating countries through passing laws and, 
since the OEEC lost its role in allocating Marshall Aid, the OECD has not had funds to 
dispense. The goods or services it produces are usually understood to fall under the 
concept of ‘soft governance’ (Mahon and MacBride, 2009). One of the most important 
services produced by the OECD is the vast databases on a multitude of economic and 
social phenomenon, collected, organised and analysed by its staff. This data constitutes 
the bedrock upon which the organization conducts its analysis, publishes reports and 
formulates policy recommendations. The tradition of collecting and assorting data 
commenced under the OEEC, which pioneered in Europe the standardisation of national 
accounts, information required in order to calculate Marshall Aid allocation (Maddison, 
1994). Over the next few decades, efforts increased to collect and analyse a broad range 
of data on OECD members, not just on economic issues, but also on education, social 
policy, technology, innovation, employment and so forth. However, data collection and 
analysis of non-members was of secondary importance (Maddison, 2005). Typically, 
projects involving non-member data were conducted by the Development Centre, and 
usually financed by particular members on a voluntary basis (through ‘part 2’ of the 
budget). OECD reports on non-members took the form of ‘unidirectional’ 
recommendations, since it was assumed that its members and staff enjoyed superior 
policy ‘know-how’ based on the assumption of the superior functioning of their 
economies.
8
 It was also often assumed that the ‘OECD way’ to economic growth, 
pursuing broadly liberalization strategies, was a ‘one-fits-all’ recipe that could be 
applied to diverse economies and societies. It was not until the 2000s that the OECD 
acknowledged their errors and the need for a more nuanced approach which appreciated 
diversity and difference (OECD, 2003). 
 
A second major service is the OECD’s role as host of forums for policy-makers 
enabling them to meet peers from other member countries as well as the relevant OECD 
expert staff to discuss a particular agenda. These forums tend to be held behind closed 
doors and many policy-makers and staff regard them as one of the organization’s chief 
assets. From the policy-makers’ perspective, their advantage is that policy-makers can 
talk frankly and exchange ideas in private, without having to be seen to ‘win’ any 
particular debate.
9
 The tradition of holding ‘secretive’ meetings dates back to the 
OEEC’s organization of meetings to discuss the sensitive topic of Marshall Plan Aid 
allocation.
10
 But the opaque nature of these forums has aroused suspicion and criticism 
from observers, who have claimed they have served as places where the richest member 
countries can forge common postures with their allies before taking their agenda onto 
other international organizations or back home. During the 1970s, the forums were used 
by the United States to engineer a Western consensus on the G77’s demand for a 
Generalised System of Preferences before confronting them at the UN (Meltzer, 1976). 
 
One of the outcomes of these forums leads us to a third major OECD service, the 
establishment of an array of governance concepts, including ‘Codes’, ‘Best Practice’, 
‘Guidelines’, ‘Standards’, ‘Norms’, ‘Principles’ and ‘Criteria’. Once established, the 
OECD uses these concepts as benchmarks with which members’ – and often, non-
members’ – policy practice is evaluated. In addition, policy-makers can use the concepts 
to justify policy domestically, ostensibly legitimised, as they are, as ‘best practise’ from 
rich, developed countries. Again, the origins of this work go back to the OEEC, 
responsible as it was for ensuring Marshall Plan Aid candidates were implementing 
trade and capital liberalization policies to the satisfaction of the ‘paymaster’. To ensure 
this was so, candidates had to present their policy achievements to an elected peer 
country, which would then subject the candidate country to rigorous questioning on 
their progress, a process known as ‘confrontation’. If the candidate could not defend 
their position, they would be forced to modify policy before receiving finance from the 
Marshall Plan (Pagani, 2002). Though the OECD subsequently lost this financial 
leverage, nonetheless, the process was gradually diffused across most levels of the 
organization. Today, ‘peer review’ and ‘peer pressure’ are considered one of the 
OECD’s major attributes, to the extent this was emulated by another ‘club’, the 
European Union, under the name ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (Schäfer, 2006). 
Scholars studying compliance argue that intellectual pressure and the desire to be seen 
to be ‘doing the right thing’ help explain the OECD’s success (Webb, 2004).  
 
In synthesis, we have argued that the OECD, though ostensibly an economic 
organization, was organized along political lines associated with the Cold War, as 
reflected in the composition and evolution of its membership and staff. Its major tasks, 
data collection and analysis, organizing forums and establishing governance concepts 
for policy evaluation, were conducted for members’ economies in their interests. The 
use and appropriateness of their work for countries beyond members was not an issue. 
As a consequence of this inward-looking stance, the OECD became over-confident its 
policies were applicable universally. The assumption was that all countries seeking to 
develop successfully should follow its guidelines and recommendations. This 
confidence started to sap – gradually – once members and staff recognised the world 
was changing and the OECD being gently nudged out from its centre: the import of 
their situation dawned slowly and reform began.  
 
From Club to Global Actor? Assessing OECD Reform 
 
Reform of the OECD from a club to a more global organization occurred in two phases. 
The first phase was triggered by the end of the Cold War, which OECD officials and 
members perceived as a political – but not an economic – challenge to the organization. 
The challenge was understood as an important, but not a ‘life-threatening’ one; reform 
was somewhat slow, and the OECD ‘club’ approach did not disappear. Indeed, it was 
not until the second phase of reform, from the end of the 1990s, that decisive and bold 
action was taken to attempt to reform the organization, including transforming what was 
increasingly perceived as an obsolete ‘club’ approach into a more global organization.
11
 
Our analysis evaluates the import of reform, particularly as regards changes in the logic 
of membership, organizational changes to staff and governance, and the ways in which 
the organization produced goods and services and for whom. 
 
Post 1989 Reform 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union was interpreted 
by OECD members and staff as proof of the superiority of the kinds of economic 
policies the organization had advocated since its origins, thus taken to legitimise the 
organization, particularly its economic functions. On the other hand, the political logic 
around which the organization had evolved had changed dramatically. With the end of 
the Cold War, questions about the future utility of the OECD increased and pressures 
grew from members to reduce its budget. Staff recruitment stagnated. As communism 
collapsed, change emerged, as regards membership, organization and purpose, but only 
slowly. Only in 1990 was Japan granted one of the three Deputy Secretary General 
posts. Still, the ‘club’ approach was not altered in this period. Indeed, OECD members 
and officials later concluded the lack of real change had been a mistake, as we discuss.  
 
Despite multiple countries in Eastern Europe expressing interest in joining the OECD 
from 1989, its own members limited enlargement. OECD officials argue that 
membership expansion is based on two internal dynamics which seek to combine 
attaining ‘symmetry’ with political ‘horse-trading’.
12
 In 1991, members agreed to accept 
only three candidate countries from Eastern Europe: the (then) Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland. Their restrictive approach can be explained by the fact that many 
non-European members did not to want the organization to become ‘even more’ 
European. Accession to Eastern Europe was ‘balanced’ by the agreement to expand to 
Mexico, which joined the NAFTA in 1994 and whose accession was promoted by the 
United States, and South Korea. Enlargement thus proceeded with Mexico (1994), the 
Czech Republic and Poland (1995), Hungary and South Korea (1996) and, finally, the 
Slovak Republic, in 2000. On joining the OECD, Mexico and South Korea left the G77, 
as it was perceived joint membership involved a conflict of interest. Symbolically they 
left behind their status as a ‘developing’ economy. Interestingly, Chile’s accession in 
2010 differed, as it remained in both organizations, to the consternation of some G77 
members (Deen, 2010). The OECD was later to acknowledge errors it made during the 
management of this stage of enlargement, particularly as regards its approach to the 
Eastern European members. These countries’ accession had been made conditional on 
their following successful adoption of economic policies recommended by the OECD, 
set out in their program ‘Partners in Transition’. But these policies assumed a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ recipe of price and trade liberalization, macroeconomic stabilisation, 
privatization and the creation of market institutions should be applied to all countries 
(OECD, 2003). Later, officials acknowledged their lack of experience in managing non-
Western economies had meant they had underestimated the diversity of these economies 
and their need for institutional building: they had shown themselves somewhat ill-
equipped to understand what was required for successful transition (OECD, 2004). 
 
Seeds of future reform were sown, however, as OECD officials modified the priorities 
as regards what goods the organization should provide, and how. Before 1989, most 
OECD work on non-members had been considered a secondary activity. Publications on 
non-members generally took the unidirectional form of ‘policy advice from the OECD’. 
Immediately, in 1990, the Centre for Cooperation with European Transition Economies 
was set up and dozens of economic and policy studies ensued including the first – and 
last - Study of the Soviet Economy, in conjunction with the IMF, the WTO and the 
EBDR in 1991. Most staff lacked experience working on transition economies, and 
some training was in order (OECD, 2004). The OECD ‘club’ approach was not 
undermined; yet work ‘on’ non-member economic systems had begun in earnest.   
 
Going global – à la carte 
Genuine attempts to transcend its ‘club’ mentality really commenced from the end of 
the 1990s. Reform was principally driven by functional concerns.
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 Both members and 
staff increasingly came to the view that the organization’s restrictive membership was 
becoming its principal handicap. Economic governance would become difficult if not 
impossible if major economic players were not involved. Moreover, the ‘rich man’s 
club’ was looking increasingly less rich. The shrinking share of economic wealth 
constituted by the OECD was encapsulated in Angus Maddison’s final report for the 
OECD before his death, in 2010, Shifting Wealth. According to his calculations, OECD 
members’ share of the global economy measured in purchasing power parity was 59 
percent in 2000: by 2010, this had dropped to 50 percent and, by 2030, would drop to 
just 43 percent, as seen in Table 3. The share of G20 non-OECD members – Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) had increased 
from 22 percent in 1990 to 31 percent in 2010, and was predicted by Maddison (2010) 
to reach nearly 36 percent by 2030. Between 2000 and 2010, OECD exports had fallen 
from 71 to 60 percent of world totals. The ‘rise of the rest’ was understood as structural, 
not transitory, and supported by new dynamics including ‘south-south’ trade, 
investment and technology transfers between firms and industrial clusters based across 
Asia, Latin America and Africa (OECD, 2010a). For decades, the OECD’s involvement 
in these regions had been minimal. It now needed them to bolster its own capacity to 
govern, its legitimacy and its relevance (OECD, 2004). Reform was implemented in the 
shadow of increasing financial pressure on the organization by its members who 
questioned its continued relevance. Donald Johnstone’s election as Secretary General 
from 1996 to 2006 was made conditional on his delivering sharp cost and staff costs.
14
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
Introspective soul-searching, critical self-assessment and complex negotiation marked 
the winding process towards agreeing on a new strategy. Senior officials were charged 
with spear-heading a reform strategy while identifying its potential obstacles. One such 
obstacle was the public image of the OECD: during the 1990s, its officials had made 
overtures to East Asian ‘tiger’ governments, but these were met with suspicion since the 
organization was still associated as the champion of the north in the Cold War.
15
 Its 
unidirectional approach to policy advice for non-members was perceived as patronising 
and not always appropriate for non-Western countries. Another potential obstacle to 
change were OECD members themselves, especially smaller European countries, 
unconvinced as they were of the needs to share their privileges with more members. A 
further challenge was OECD staff itself, both professional and administrative, most of 
whom lacked an understanding of non-Western economies, languages and cultures 
(OECD 2005a).   
 
Gradually, a consensus was forged on a blueprint for reform, with enlargement at its 
heart, which was implemented from the second half of the 2000s. Critically, 
enlargement was made conditional on prior approval of governance and budget reforms. 
As a sign of the changing times, for the first time, a Secretary General from a 
developing country, Mexico, was elected from 2006. The major significance of the 
governance reform, passed in 2006 - which had mainly been at the insistence of the 
United States - was the introduction of the Qualified Majority Voting mechanism. 
Decisions no longer required unanimity but could be taken with support of 60 percent of 
members, unless they were blocked by a group of three or more members who 
combined 25 percent of Part 1 of the budget (OECD, 2006). Budgetary reform was 
completed in 2008. Previously, the United States paid 25 percent and Japan nearly 20 
percent of the core budget, whilst two thirds of members paid less than 2 percent each 
and one third less than 1 percent each. A new system was introduced whereby one third 
of the core (Part 1) budget would be equally financed by all members, phased in over a 
ten year period, while the cost of the other two thirds would be shared according to 
capacity to pay. The overall effect was that the share of the budget paid by the United 
States and Japan would decrease (OECD, 2008). Another decision was that that new 
members would have to cover all the costs of membership, paying more than that by 
original members of the same size (Bourgon, 2009). 
 
Enlargement finally got the green light. Roadmaps for accession to Chile, Estonia, 
Israel, the Russian Federation and Slovenia – five countries which had all previously 
signalled interest in joining - were signed in 2007. Again, the combined geographical 
profile of the accession countries reflected the desire of OECD members to balance 
‘European’ versus ‘non-European’ entrants. Chile, Israel and Slovenia acceded during 
2010, Estonia’s accession expected to occur during 2010. Russia’s accession, however, 
was delayed. Of these five countries, Russia had been the first to be considered as a 
candidate for accession as far back as the mid 1990s. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had 
expressed an interest in Russia’s joining in 1996, to which the Council replied formally 
that this was an ‘ultimate shared goal’ in 1997. Since then, extensive cooperation took 
place but a number of obstacles reared their heads both from within Russia as well as 
from certain OECD members. Delays ensued as frustration grew. When the 2007 
roadmap was drawn up, Russia was nearly not included, being listed only at the last 
minute after intensive lobbying. Its future accession has been made conditional on its 
joining the WTO and signing the OECD anti-corruption convention, and top officials 
remain optimistic, though there is are private concerns Russia should not be kept 
waiting too long. 
 
But even with the addition of Russia, this wave of enlargement does little to 
fundamentally alter the declining economic importance of OECD members. 
Recognising this, a programme entitled ‘enhanced engagement’ was launched, also in 
2007, for implementation in five key economies: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia (due to 
pressure by Australia) and South Africa. Though these countries had not necessarily 
stated their interest in joining, they were targeted by the OECD as countries that ‘might 
eventually be willing and able to join’ (OECD, 2010b as well as being those the 
organization needed to engage with in order to presume it was representative of the 
world economy. From 2008, these countries were invited to participate in the main 
economic sessions of Ministerial Council Meetings, as well as in a select number of 
committees and working parties at different levels of intensity, from ad-hoc to regular or 
full participation. This participation of these non-members in OECD business is 
ongoing and a comprehensive list of individual countries’ participation is published as 
part of the OECD Global Relations Programme. Participation, interestingly, is quite 
uneven: Brazil and India are much more involved than China. Brazil participates in over 
a dozen committees, from environmental policy to trade, competition and science and 
technology, while India is involved in the committees on agriculture, often, with full 
member rights, fiscal affairs, information and communications technology, consumer 
policy, steel, higher education and statistics (OECD 2010b: Table 4). In contrast, 
China’s participation is mostly limited to work by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 
Interestingly, non-member such as Argentina and Singapore are active in more 
committees than China. 
 
Overtures by the OECD towards more inclusive governance can, and do, backfire. It 
takes two to tango, after all. The case of China, an OECD priority, is revealing. Formal 
bilateral relations between the OECD and China were pioneered by Secretary General 
Jean-Claude Paye (1984-1996) and were centred on taxation. By 2005, OECD officials 
perceived relations with China were blossoming (OECD, 2005b). Though some 
members queried China’s human rights record, it was decided that the advantages of 
engaging with China far outweighed any potential disadvantages. Tensions in the 
relationship started to emerge, however. China was concerned about the over-
representation of Europeans in the OECD: for instance, if it attended Working Party 3 
meetings, Chinese delegates had to listen in silence to speeches by small countries such 
as the Netherlands. OECD members and officials became concerned that China enjoys 
its services but does not intend to commit itself to its standards and norms through 
membership. Tensions came to a head in 2009 with the OECD’s tax havens work, 
which included a project to name and shame ‘non-cooperative’ tax havens. Hong Kong 
and Macau were included on the provisional list: China responded furiously, stating this 
was their affair. The OECD finally backed down, removing both, on the agreement that 
China would assume responsibility for their management. Still vexed, China blocked 
the OECD from participating in the G20 summit in London in April 2009. The OECD 
returned to G20 business when, on the direct invitation of President Obama, Angel 
Gurría attended the Pittsburgh meeting in September 2009 (OECD, 2010b 11). 
 
Another strand of reform is organizational, relating to OECD staff and the ways in 
which work was done. After freezes on recruitment during the 1980s and 1990s, new 
blood was recruited into the OECD, especially at professionals at the lower level, as 
shown in Table 2. Despite the share of French, British and American staff in ‘A’ 
category posts having fallen, in 2009 the three countries combined still made up 45 
percent of these jobs and nearly half the top ‘A 5-7’ posts. Prior to reform, most OECD 
work on non-members was done through the ‘Centre for Cooperation with Economies 
in Transition’. This was replaced by the ‘Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members’ in 
1997. Staff received training in non-Western economies and languages, and different 
theoretical perspectives, and was encouraged to adopt less confrontation and more 
confidence-building approaches to non-members. But this was quickly perceived as not 
going far enough: OECD work for non-members was still perceived as being to 
patronising and ‘missionary’ by internal critics. A more ‘aggressive’ strategy which 
ensured other countries deemed vital for the organization’s future were brought on 
board was required (OECD 2004). This required that key countries be treated as equals 
or ‘peers’ (OECD, 2010b 5). So, work on non-members was reformed: in 2001, the 
nearly 120 staff working at the ‘Centre for Cooperation with Non-Members’ was 
transferred directly into standard OECD Directorates. Henceforth, OECD work on non-
members would be mainstreamed; a publication on agricultural reform in Africa would 
henceforth be published by the Directorate on Agriculture, as part of core OECD work. 
By mainstreaming work on non-members, it was hoped the OECD’s former emphasis 
on training and assistance could be replaced by policy dialogue, and promotion of best 
practices, standards and instruments (OECD, 2005a). The reform also meant that work 
on non-members would be financed by the core budget, not by voluntary contributions.  
 
Finally, OECD reform has attempted to render the distribution of the goods and services 
it provides more inclusive. This has taken two major forms: the establishment of 
‘network’ governance across all continents, and accelerated collaboration with other 
organizations, including at international, national and local levels. Network governance 
is organised on a regional basis, and targets Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, Latin 
America, the Middle East and North Africa, Africa, and other Asian non-members. 
OECD staff attempt to identify areas of existing work that are of interest to the region. 
Incentives are offered to staff to establish relations with governments or institutions 
such as development banks and other organizations, and then to identify common 
projects. Countries from these regions are also invited to participate in various OECD 
committees and working parties at different levels (ad-hoc, regular or equivalent to a 
member). Secondly, significant steps have been taken, particularly from 2005, to 
sharply increase the OECD’s collaboration with other international, regional and local 
organizations in the production of joint reports, or the holding of jointly organised 
conferences or training sessions. This is justified by the need to legitimise OECD output 
around the world, especially in those areas where it has not traditionally worked, as well 
as to avoid duplication. A comprehensive inventory of these activities outlining the 
nature of the activities, expected outcomes and the division of labour has been 
published by the OECD and reveals a clear change in strategy (OECD, 2007). 
 
Discussion 
 
Established in 1961, the OECD, inheriting much from its predecessor, the OEEC, 
functioned as a club model of multilateralism par excellence for much of its history. By 
restricting membership to certain Western capitalist economies, it was deemed by some 
an excellent place for discussion by the powerful countries, as negotiations among a 
few, homogenous members were less burdensome than those at more universal fora, 
such as the UN (Fratiani and Pattison, 1976). When the Cold War ended in 1989, the 
OECD lost much of its original political rationale, and yet its economic rationale, as a 
champion of Western-style capitalism, was, to some extent, legitimised. But the loss of 
its political rationale - coinciding with the hostile decade of the 1980s for international 
organizations - resulted in its coming under increased pressure by members to cut costs. 
Its critical challenge, however, was economic, in the form of a gradual recognition that 
OECD members were increasingly vulnerable to the economies of non-members and, 
also, that OECD members were shrinking in economic importance in the shadows of 
emerging new economic players. If it was no longer a club of Western allies fighting 
communism and only a declining club of the rich, industrialised nations, what did its 
future hold? 
 
Real reform accelerated from the turn of the twenty-first century. At its heart was the 
recognition that the OECD club needed to address its place in the changing global 
economy by becoming more inclusive. For members, it was vital that key economic 
players were brought in if economic governance was to be meaningful. For staff, 
enlargement became one of the main keys to organizational survival. Inclusion did not 
amount to a strategy to transform itself from a club to a fully inclusive or global 
organization. The new logic of inclusion follows a strategy of incremental enlargement: 
going global ‘à la carte’. Four new members joined in 2010 but, even with the accession 
of the Russian Federation, OECD members’ share in the global economy will not 
increase. The so-called ‘enhanced engagement’ programme reveals the OECD’s interest 
in the ‘big players’, especially China and India, but also Brazil, South Africa and 
Indonesia. Critics might say the OECD is not interested in inclusion; it is merely wishes 
to extend the club to a few other rich countries. But its reform is not superficial. Change 
is palpable in a change of attitude; pride has been swallowed and staff and members are 
determined to engage with non-member countries as ‘partners’. For decades, the goods 
and services provided by the OECD were nearly exclusively for Western developed 
economies. This is changing – gradually - in the recognition that the ‘OECD way’ is not 
the only way, and that there are different legitimate approaches to development. OECD 
services for non-members are no longer to be unidirectional ‘policy advice’ but to take 
the form of ‘policy dialogue’. Mainstreaming its work on non-members across all 
Directorates is one important example of this change. But is all this reform too late to 
guarantee the OECD’s role as a key player in the architecture of global governance? In 
its favour, the OECD has earned a solid reputation for producing data and analysis: 
indeed, this is its chief asset in its search for a role in global governance. New 
structures, such as the G20, lack a Secretariat, so there are avenues for synergy here. Its 
main disadvantages continue to be its legacy as a transatlantic organization, with the 
bulk of jobs still staffed by Western Europeans and Americans. This may limit its 
capacity to communicate with and understand non-Western potential members, 
particularly, Asian ones. Finally, the big question remains unanswered: the OECD 
needs the emerging economies, but do they need the OECD? 
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 Stephen Marris and Angus Maddison, both of whom provided help during the writing 
of this article, sadly passed away before it was completed. The authors would like to 
dedicate this paper to their memories. 
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